Khmer Times, Opinion, 9 February 2022 (Link)
1. Dichotomy of debate: international intervention or endogenous initiative?
It takes only a short time to start a war but ending it and building peace requires generations. Cambodia’s three decades of civil war had sowed distrust and a vicious cycle of structural violence on top of the mutually annihilating behaviour and social destruction. As a result, the whole society had lost every chance of development, as poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and the deprivation of basic human rights became the norms.
The Win-Win Policy refers to the national reconciliation policy crafted and implemented by Prime Minister Hun Sen from 1996 to 1998 to end the more than three decades of civil war through dismantling the Khmer Rouge’s political organisation and integrating them into the social, economic, and political life of the Cambodian state.
Not much research has been done on this specific topic due to international perception that peace was fully restored after the 1993 United Nations-brokered elections. However, this perception has gradually changed. More scholars and media communities have started to acknowledge that the 1993 election was merely one building block of the long process of peace-building and was not a definitive point of peace attainment.
When discussing Cambodia’s peace, one should not adopt a mutually-denial manner and focus only on who should take the monopoly of credits for Cambodia’s peace, the international community or the Cambodian government. Discussion on Cambodia’s peace-building tends to adopt two opposite extremes, the “overemphasis on external intervention” and the “nationalistic monopoly of peace.” The former group thinks that the international community should be more assertive in Cambodia’s peace process and should not heed to political compromise with the Hun Sen government. They believe that the international community has an obligation to bring peace to Cambodian people. However, they tend to ignore the limited time and resources that the international community could commit.
The overemphasis on foreign intervention draws criticisms of an imperialist or colonial mindset in which the roles of local actors are not fully appreciated. Consequently, the “nationalistic monopoly of peace” paradigm has emerged to countervail the “overemphasis on external intervention” paradigm to give credits to local actors and initiatives. Indeed, there were historical facts showing achievements by the local actors. Unfortunately, they were not fully appreciated by some circles of the international community. The Cambodian government’s narrative on the Khmer-initiated Win-Win Policy is thus viewed as a propaganda attempting to promote local monopolisation of Cambodia’s attainment of peace. However, the “nationalistic monopoly of peace” paradigm has its firm ground. As war lingered on, monopolisation of the peace process by local stakeholders increased because international intervention could not endure the lengthy peace-building process that could take decades. Aid fatigue and human resource exhaustion are the limit of international intervention.
Nevertheless, it is not right to suggest that total peace can be achieved without external involvement because if international actors still provide military, diplomatic, and political support or even media support to rebel groups, secessionist groups, or groups that seek the violent overthrow of the government, peace created by local stakeholders cannot withstand. Thus, on top of the domestic stakeholders’ commitment to peacebuilding, durable peace requires direct and indirect support from the international community for state legitimacy.
2. Peace Theories
There are a lot of peace theories. Among other, one of the most prominent ones was proposed by Johan Galtung, the so-called “positive” and “negative” peace. Peace does not merely mean the total absence of any conflict. It means the absence of violence in all forms and a conflict unfolding constructively. This is called “positive peace” that also indicates the simultaneous presence of many desirable dimensions of mind and society, such as harmony, justice, equity, sustainable development, etc.
Another important theory was on “reconciliation” proposed by Louis Kriesberg. He identifies four dimensions of reconciliation essential for conflict transformation and peacebuilding in post-war societies, which are shared truth, justice, regard, and security.
“Truth” is important as societies divided after mass crime, tend to deny what members of the other side have experienced and thus need to openly recognise that they have different views of reality. They might develop a shared truth at a higher level, supported by official investigations, judicial proceedings, and literary and mass media reporting to acknowledge the abuses that had occurred.
“Justice” is needed, as those who have suffered oppression or atrocities seek redress, which may take the form of restitution or compensation, but also the punishment of those who committed injustices. Justice may furthermore be exhibited in politics offering protection against future harm and discrimination.
“Expression of regard” by members of each community towards one another entails recognising the humanity of the others and their human rights.
“Security”, in the sense of personal or collective safety and well-being, is a constitutive part of reconciliation. Security exists as the adversaries feel a minimum of trust and have reason to believe they can look forward to living together without one side threatening the other.
3. Lessons from Cambodia’s Peacebuilding Experiences
“War cannot end war”
Based on Hun Sen’s Win-Win Policy, the most important lesson that can be drawn from Cambodia’s experience is that war cannot end war. Only peaceful negotiation, mutual understanding, and at times, mutual compromise, and concession can lead to peace because no single party can afford to be seen as losing. Because sometimes losing can be synonymous to death in warring societies.
The Importance of “Security” and “Regard”
Peace negotiators need to identify the “security” dimension within the “reconciliation” process, which can help address the concerns of interlocuters.
Integrating an armed faction into a government’s armed forces to end a civil war is not easy, as the risk is too high for both sides. The guarantee of survival and trust towards such a guarantee is a must. After gaining experience from the protracted wars, Hun Sen understood clearly that “security” was vitally important for each warring faction before any peace agreement could be achieved.
As such, he devised basic conditions of the Win-Win Policy based on three core elements, namely the guarantee of life, the guarantee of employment and status, and the guarantee of personal properties. Such conditions bode well with some elements of the Khmer Rouge although trust was a key factor in implementing each step of the Win-Win Policy.
Restoring peace is important, but making it durable is also equally important. One of the four dimensions of reconciliation, according to Kriesberg, is the “expression of regard” by members of one community towards another that entails recognising the humanity of the other and their human rights, including political rights and freedom.
Liberal multi-party democracy is considered the cornerstone for such “regard” that supports the “positive peace” based on ballots, not bullets. This dimension was included in the long-term development and the post-Win-Win Policy peacebuilding process. Citizens in Anlong Veng, the Khmer Rouge’s last stronghold, also exercised their rights in the national elections in July 1998. Prime Minister Hun Sen clearly understands multi-party electoral democracy and has a firm commitment towards upholding it, along with the respect for human rights and freedom because, from his own experience, the suppression would lead to armed struggles and wars.
Violence during elections has gradually disappeared from the Cambodian political scene. This is a fact in Cambodian political history showing the maturity of its political culture, as it is moving toward “positive peace”. The elections in 1998 did not have the picture of automatic rifles wielded in the streets like when UNTAC organised it in 1993. Those who looked after security stayed outside the stations and carried no weapons. All votes were counted right at the stations, different from the UNTAC administered elections in 1993 when ballots were brought to where they called “safe havens” to be counted.
Elimination of Structural Violence
The possession of armed forces by various political groups and factions is one critical factor for prolonged civil war or structural violence in Cambodia. With armed organizations, political groups can become rebel anytime or a force for coup d’etat whenever their political group deems that the conditions or power sharing status are less beneficial. After the completion of the 1998 integration through the Win-Win Policy, Cambodia finally achieved in eliminating this major cause of structural violence and the whole armed factions fall under the command of a single national army. This is unprecedented in Cambodian modern history.
Hun Sen wanted to eliminate the structure of violence by avoiding revenge and pushing for “culture of dialogue” that he has been practicing all along from peace negotiation with the then Prince Norodom Sihanouk in the late 1980s, to the Win-Win Policy with the Khmer Rouge and up to the present when he tries to conduct dialogue with different political parties or groups.
Identifying key negotiators is key for peace talks
Having competent and influential negotiators is also crucial. The less the number, the less likelihood of division. Cambodia is fortunate in this account, as it is relatively homogenous, and the key negotiators were easy to be identified, such as the former King Norodom Sihanouk and Prime Minister Hun Sen.
Nevertheless, in reality, the domination of a few actors, like the case of Hun Sen, is rare because all warring factions often try to achieve a balance of power for their safety. The power balance perpetuate wars through “structural violence”, as each side does not want to lose. Even Hun Sen himself had faced differing opinions and dissenting actors within the government. While peaceful negotiation is the preferable way to proceed, it cannot neglect the bargaining power resulting from military campaigns and military strength, administrative and territorial occupation rate, and public support.
“There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development”
Finally, conducive environment that can support the sustainability of peace is paramount. Peace and sustainable development are mutually reinforcing. Peace cannot be sustained if there are poverty, hunger, inequality, unemployment, injustice, poor public services, and weak governance.
Peace cannot be sustained without quality education, healthcare, proper and equal access to social security, decent work, and economic growth.
Such a long list of requirements means that peace is extremely difficult to build and sustain. Therefore, maintaining the existing peace should be the top priority of every government, if not the whole world.
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