Friday, November 8, 2019

Dynamism of Chinese investment in Cambodia





Asia Times, DevelopmentFDI|Opinion
November 8, 2019
Dynamism of Chinese investment in Cambodia
According to the “ASEAN Investment Report 2019,” Cambodia’s FDI inflows reached an all-time high last year, with growth concentrated in manufacturing and services, particularly finance and insurance. Foreign direct investment increased by 15% to US$3.1 billion, the highest level ever recorded.
Cambodia’s record FDI number is easily dwarfed by what other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are receiving, considering that the region’s FDI inflows reached a record high of $155 billion last year, of which Singapore received $77 billion, Indonesia $22 billion, and Vietnam $16 billion.
China is no doubt the current largest investor in Cambodia. In 2017 and 2018, China accounted for 23% and 26% of the total $2.7 billion and $3.1 billion respectively. It was followed by a combined FDI from ASEAN member states, at 22% and 25% in 2017 and 2018 respectively.
The unfortunate thing is that when there is talk about China, negative views always come up. It is strange that people are complaining about China while everyone is trying so hard to gain more trade, more investment, and larger tourist inflows from China. Simple examples abound. Bilateral trade between China and Vietnam hit $106.71 billion in 2018. More than 10 million Chinese visited Thailand last year, contributing more than $100 billion in revenue to the country. Every country in the region envies that number.
China contributes a lot to Cambodia’s economy, building infrastructure such as hydropower plants and road connectivities, contributing capital through the real-estate and construction sectors, creating jobs though increasing manufacturing investment and sending in more than 2 million tourists last year.
To improve connectivity between Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, an expressway costing $1.87 billion under a build-operate-transfer arrangement is being constructed, the first expressway in Cambodia. The most rapid increase in high-rise building numbers in the provincial capital of Sihanoukville hit a record last year when 238 buildings were approved, up from 188 buildings in 2017.
Over-reliance on China does involve macro-economic risks that can be heightened further by superpowers’ geopolitical rivalry and constant internationalization of Cambodia’s domestic politics.
Chinese FDI mainly focuses on the real-estate and financial sectors, which typically are prone to boom-and-bust cycles and external factors. Rising domestic credit in the construction sector also increases the financial sector’s vulnerability.
Geopolitically, Cambodia is often labeled as “being bought” or as a “vassal state of China” whenever the dynamism of superpowers’ geopolitical rivalry is put into focus.
The internationalization of Cambodia’s domestic politics has caused much harm to its economy and investment confidence at a level not seen in any other country in the region. Anti-China rhetoric provoked by opposition groups, threats of a coup or toppling of the government through people power, threats of the possible withdrawal of trade preferences provided by the European Union through the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, all of these have caused investors and tourists to drag their feet.
Even though it has yet to materialize, the threat of the EBA withdrawal has already caused investors to think twice about buying or sourcing products from Cambodia. According to a study by the World Bank, the estimated decline in Cambodia’s garment and footwear exports if the EBA is suspended is $510 million, or 5.4% of Cambodia’s total garment and footwear exports. This does not take into account of the social impact caused by disruption of economic sustainability and efforts on poverty alleviation. It is hard to imagine the possible impact on the livelihoods of 800,000 garment workers, 80% of whom are women, should many of them be forced out of their jobs, leaving them to resort to migration or other forms of vulnerable jobs.
Cambodia understands that “internationalization” of its domestic politics will not go away any time soon, especially when its evolving young democracy is becoming “electoral currency” for some foreign politicians who often have oversimplified views over Cambodia’s historical and political complexities, and are not fully aware of the values of the “longest peace in Cambodia’s modern history.”
In addressing macroeconomic challenges apart from the above-mentioned political aspects, it is observed that the government is pursuing three major venues, namely structural and industrial diversification, drastic reforms to cut business costs and the strengthening of the logistics sector, and development of a digital economy.
Structural and industrial diversification has been pursued through various supports and incentives that the government is providing toward non-garment manufacturing companies, especially those that can create many jobs and provide technical training for higher-skilled labor. The main strategies and action lines are elaborated in the Industrial Development Policy (IDP).
Structural adjustment has been put into place starting from late March this year through drastic reforms that outlined a 17-point strategy to reduce the cost of doing business. With these new reforms, the government expects to save the private sector up to $400 million a year. Development of Cambodia’s logistics masterplan and strengthening of a more competitive logistics sector also added up momentum to efforts in cutting business costs.
On cultivating new industries, Cambodia’s strong orientation toward building a digital economy presents opportunities not just for the country but also for potential investors. Cambodia’s digital economy has been gradually taking shape and creating new business activities in digital payment, online entertainment and e-commerce, while a tech-savvy new generation can become both market users or even a workforce to create such platforms.

Monday, November 4, 2019

Cambodia as emerging connector between the EU and ASEAN


Khmer Times, Opinion
November 4, 2019
Cambodia as emerging connector between the EU and ASEAN
Sim Vireak /

Cambodia and the EU has enjoyed a strong multifaceted cooperation for decades. With the evolving geopolitical landscape, trade wars and weakening multilateralism, both sides understand the importance in bolstering ties as great opportunities to promote mutual interest.
First, although Cambodia’s democracy is young, Cambodia is not a communist nor socialist country and therefore it can easily adapt with the EU’s strategic values and principles. Cambodia always attaches great importance to quality relations with the EU taking into account of Cambodia’s “longest peace in modern history”, peaceful democratization, and promotion of human-centered development.
For the EU, Cambodia is seen as an emerging connector in the relationship between the former and ASEAN. Despite being a small state and latecomer, Cambodia has proven to be an active proponent of multilateralism. The boldness of assuming its first ASEAN chairmanship in 2002 after merely three years of accession demonstrates a strong political will and commitment to complying with multilateralism. This small nation will take this important work again in 2022. The EU also knows that Cambodia always supports the establishment of a strategic partnership between ASEAN and the EU. Cambodia’s hosting of the 13th Asia-Europe Europe Meeting (ASEM13) next year will become another milestone in further strengthening the ASEAN-EU collaboration with the Kingdom as an enabling platform. The increasing attention of the EU towards ASEAN is not surprising considering the latter’s sophisticated regional architecture and solid results as a hub for regionalism and multilateralism and a powerful growth engine of the world economy with an increasingly integrated market.
From Cambodia’s perspective, maximizing relations with the “EU Trio”, namely France, Germany and Brussels is of utmost importance.
France is considered as Cambodia’s “Plus Grand Ami en Europe” (most grand friend in Europe) considering France’s past heritage in Southeast Asia. The linkage is socially very visible as Cambodia continues to be a Francophone with many universities possessing the intellectual legacy in French such as law schools, public administration, engineering and technologies, and medical sciences. Cambodian foreign ministers often deliver statement at the United Nations General Assembly in both French and English, and it is interesting to note that French is used in the most sensitive parts of the speech to express Cambodia’s concerns and nuances. There are around 140 French companies out of a total of around 400 European companies in Cambodia. France is Cambodia’s largest rice buyer in Europe with 86,050 tons of import in 2018, and the 5th largest EU’s individual trade partner with Cambodia, after Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands.
In the case of Germany, it is seen as a strong and reliable partner for Cambodia. Being an economic powerhouse, and a pragmatic and open minded friend, Germany has long supported peaceful democratization of Cambodia through assistance towards structural reform, social investment, modernization and capacity-strengthening of state apparatus. The recent visit in October of ministers holding key portfolio related to such purposes are self-evident. It is no doubt that Germany is one of the most important actors in the EU. Germany currently sends 96 MPs to the European Parliament. It was the largest net contributor to the EU in 2017 and paid 13 billion euros more to the EU than it received from it in funding. Germany will hold the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union again from July to December in 2020. Moreover, the current President of the European Commission is also German, Ursula von der Leyen.
The next important player should be Brussels. The EU is Europe’s compounding complex of diverse powers and interests. Being able to navigate across various actors and interests within Brussels, which is the EU’s de-facto capital is of paramount importance to enhance better understanding of Cambodia as well as to identify areas of practical cooperation as much as possible for mutual benefits. Multi-stakeholders should be involved in this process including through parliamentary framework.
Without prejudice to the good relations that Cambodia is having with other EU member states, besides these three trios, another layer of focus can be also observed through the asset that Cambodia has in terms of its relations with Eastern Europe. It is worth to note that Cambodia also has many friends in Eastern part of Europe who are now becoming more affluent with vibrant democracies within the EU. Cambodia never forgets that Eastern Europe recognized the existence of genocide and had extended a helping hand during Cambodia’s difficult times.
In the future, with consistently strong economic growth, Cambodia will graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) and the likelihood of becoming an upper-middle-income country by 2030 and a high-income economy by 2050 is not illusory. In the new development phase, aid will evaporate and be gradually substituted by trade, which is more powerful and sustainable tool in terms of wealth and job creation, and reduction of dependency. Like other traditional donors, the EU will gradually phase out its Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Cambodia. As such, to prepare for this structural shifting of Cambodia’s economy, Cambodia and the EU should also start discussing on topic such as “trade-not-aid strategy” to ensure economic sustainability through industrial and market diversification.
The future looks bright for both sides in terms of promoting bilateral interest as well as multilateralism that is supportive of common peace and shared prosperity in the region.
To Cambodia and the EU: let’s remain strongly connected, be future oriented and be bolder.

Sim Vireak, Strategic Advisor of Asian Vision Institute (AVI)


Thursday, October 17, 2019

‘ASEAN Way’ key to solving South China Sea conflicts




Diplomacy, Territorial disputes|Opinion
October 17, 2019
‘ASEAN Way’ key to solving South China Sea conflicts



The South China Sea (SCS) issue has been a bottleneck for ASEAN-China cooperation, a cause of strain in the unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and a reason for allegations and geopolitical conspiracies. Every ASEAN member state, including Vietnam, China’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, acknowledges that the ASEAN-China partnership is the most dynamic. However, with the uneasy relations between China and Vietnam on SCS issues, the concern looms whether ASEAN will be put into direct confrontation with China under Vietnam’s ASEAN chairmanship and membership of the United Nations Security Council next year.
ASEAN as an institution has been increasingly exhausted by the internationalization of SCS issues. Drafting sessions of ASEAN statements always involve enduring overnight negotiations from technical level to ministerial level. ASEAN is constantly on the verge of a breakdown like what happened during the negotiation of the joint communiqué in Phnom Penh in 2012. In any circumstance, there is a growing trend to accept the oversimplification that any failure to reach a consensus over a joint communiqué or any other ASEAN statements in which SCS issues are involved are caused by Cambodia, which is perceived as a vassal state of China, despite the fact that negotiations among 10 actors with different interests and positions are highly complex.
The focus on ASEAN integration and community-building has earned secondary attention because of the great energy spent on SCS issues. Countries find themselves squeezed over how they should define regional interest, how to ensure unity and solidarity in accordance with the “ASEAN Way” – which utilizes compromise, consensus, and consultation while prioritizing informal decision-making processes and non-conflictual ways of addressing outstanding issues – and how to ensure the mutual trust and confidence that have supported the ASEAN community thus far.
It is in ASEAN’s interest that it try to visualize the community beyond the SCS issues. It is in the interests of both ASEAN and China that they find better ways to mitigate the growing distrust between Beijing and some ASEAN claimant states over these issues.
Internationalization, antagonism and confrontation do not serve the interests of peace and stability in the region.
Looking at past experiences, ASEAN has its own know-how on mediation. There are examples of how the bloc dealt with complex internal issues between ASEAN member states as well as between ASEAN member states and external actors.
The most recent case was when Malaysia mediated for a compromise text between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the issues of Rakhine state during the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement (CoB-NAM) in Caracas, Venezuela, in July.
When clashes erupted between Cambodia and Thailand over the ownership of the land surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple, the mediating role of then-Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natelegawa through “shuttle diplomacy” in 2011 was exemplary. Marty’s diplomacy helped cool the situation down and partially contributed to stopping bloodshed.
In retrospect, Cambodia’s conflict with Thailand proved that internationalizing territorial disputes has not led to any solution. Cambodia and Thailand were told by ASEAN member states not to internationalize territorial issues, and that both countries should resort to international law, to conduct dialogue peacefully, to prevent wars and to find ways that both countries’ governments and people could accept with grace and honor.
While Cambodia has two International Court of Justice rulings, in 1962 and 2013, to back its legitimate claims, none of the current claimant states of SCS territory has any ICJ ruling that has universal binding effect.
When China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have overlapping claims, who is supposed to judge their legitimacy? When claims are not settled, the heated discussion on SCS issues raises the question of whether it is about the advocacy of international law and rule-based international order or about alliance-making and profiteering from strategic containment policy of or by the superpowers.
At the end of the day, bilateral trust and dialogue are the only way out. The fact is even though Cambodia has two ICJ rulings in hand, would the situation be calmed down without common desire and mutual trust between Cambodia and Thailand?
For the SCS issues, one has to acknowledge that the trust factor has been diminished among the claimant states to support robust bilateral dialogues. Trust cannot be built by the increase of military-related activities, sending of aircraft carriers, increase of naval fleets, submarines, oil exploration or building of encircling alliances. Mobilizing all ASEAN member states, including the non-claimants, to gang up against China or tarnishing China’s image in international fora deviates from ASEAN’s modus operandi, which prioritizes consultation, dialogue and non-conflictual and non-confrontational ways. Such actions do not encourage China to engage meaningfully in negotiations either.
There is a need for brokerage and mediation to restore and stabilize trust among claimant states so that they can return to institutionalize bilateral talks firmly. To that end, Indonesia is probably the best candidate to do so. As a non-claimant to disputed territory in the SCS, coupled with Indonesia’s non-antagonistic relations with China, its maturity in maintaining ASEAN centrality and balancing regional interest with external partners, Indonesia knows best how to utilize the “ASEAN Way” and enjoys considerable trust from all parties involved to undertake such an important task for international peace and stability.