Cambodia’s three wishes for 2020

Cambodia’s three wishes for 2020

Asia Times, Outlook 2020/Opinion , January 2, 2020

By Sim Vireak

As Cambodia faces domestic and international challenges, the country is pinning its hopes on three key issues for 2020, namely its position amid geopolitical competition, a new domestic political culture, and economic resilience.

Geopolitical melting pot

For good or for bad, Cambodia has always been the darling, if not the trash bin, of geopolitical competition. Despite the fact that the last geopolitical proxy war was tragic, the temptation to use Cambodia as a geopolitical platform is re-emerging between the US and China as well as between China and Vietnam.

Cambodia should learn from Thailand in terms of how the latter has never been colonized but instead has always served as a platform for healthy competition that is beneficial for Thailand both economically and politically.

Historically, Cambodia can also take aspiration from its 16th- and 17th-century position when it was the center of commercial connectivity in the region that could balance harmonious co-existence among Chinese, Japanese and European traders. It was known that Phnom Penh in those days was the international and regional Mekong upstream port-of-trade and marketing emporium and a major supplier of deerskins that were shipped to Tokugawa Japan, in return for a variety of silver and international products.

Key to this point is how Cambodia can identify its contemporary “deerskins” that could help appease American, Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese and European partners altogether. How can Cambodia position itself as a geopolitical melting pot without another disaster to its own people like that in the period from the 1970s to the 1990s? How can Cambodia appease different players while firmly protecting its sovereignty, independence and national interests?

Let’s cite concrete examples. If the US perceives that Cambodia is hosting a Chinese military port in Ream Naval Base, Cambodia can possibly address such distrust by resuming military exercise with the US at that base at mutually agreeable terms. If the US perceives that Cambodia is hosting a Chinese airbase in Koh Kong province, Cambodia can probably outsource airport management to joint-venture companies that may dilute the Chinese monopoly while maintaining mutual economic benefits among all parties concerned.

If Vietnam perceives that Cambodia is supporting China on South China Sea issues, Cambodia can possibly encourage Vietnam to create a bilateral border mechanism with China to institutionalize constructive dialogues like that between Cambodia and Thailand.

Regarding the South China Sea, there is a growing trend to accept the oversimplification that any failure to reach a consensus over a joint communiqué or any other ASEAN statements in which SCS issues are involved are caused by Cambodia, which is perceived as a vassal state of China, despite the fact that negotiations among 10 actors with different interests and positions are highly complex.

Vietnam and the US should be able to understand by now that it can just never happen that Cambodia would support either China or Vietnam, which have overlapping claims with other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Because it was an indisputable fact that when Cambodia had territorial issues with Thailand over the ownership of land surrounding the Preah Vihear Temple, neither China, the US, Vietnam, the Philippines or Japan could take any position to the contrary.

It is quite obvious that Cambodia’s position remains the same, taking no side on territorial issues in the South China Sea, and urging states directly involved to deal with the issues among themselves peacefully without provocation, threat or coercion, demonization or victimization.

New domestic political culture

There exists an exceptional opportunity for Cambodia to reset its domestic political culture after the dissolution of an opposition that aligned itself with constant foreign interventions, extremism, racism and non-democratic regime change.

Cambodia should reinvent national consensus and national reconciliation among domestic political actors by building a new political culture that is based on dialogue, policy-based debate, and parliamentary participation. There is a strong hope for future politicians to learn to open their hearts and agree to disagree based on national interest and national consensus.

To that end, Cambodia can learn from Japan’s mature democracy that is less antagonistic and agitating than some Western versions of democracy, which are now being undermined by populism, extreme nationalism and ideological polarization.

Economic resilience and diversified economy

Despite the threat from the European Union to withdraw preferential trade treatment under the Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, Cambodia should be able to assert clearly, “No EBA, no problem.”

Looking back to the past, one should not underestimate Cambodia’s resilience. Cambodia was able to withstand the 12-year economic embargo by many nations starting from 1979 when the  genocidal Khmer Rouge regime was toppled with support from Vietnamese forces. It also withstood the economic crisis in 2008 following the sudden massive withdrawal of Korean investors due to the global financial crisis. Cambodia also manifested its resilience when Thailand decided to crack down on illegal laborers in 2014, and eventually ousted nearly 200,000 jobless Cambodians.

The current macro-economic stability even provides sober ground to believe in Cambodia’s resilience as compared with the previous economic shocks. For instance, the government collected more than US$4.5 billion in revenue from customs and taxation during the first nine months of 2019, with tax collection exceeding the target by $800 million. Moreover, the government has also reserved around $3 billion to cope with any possible shock.

Apart from preventive measures against external economic shocks, domestically, there is hope that Cambodia will be able to encourage healthy and diversified economic competition among domestic actors. For instance, the government can encourage tycoons to invest in new industries or factories that create jobs instead of heavily investing in sectors that do not diversify the economic base or create sufficient jobs for the young workforce.

The EU needs to be more realistic

Khmer Times, Opinion, December 17, 2019

The EU needs to be more realistic

Sim Vireak 

Protectionism is re-emerging as a common challenge that all regional and global mechanisms try to address. That holds true for both the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).

Despite sharing determination to fight against trade barriers and protectionism, interactions between the EU and some Asean member states (AMS) do not show that this mission is equally practised.

For instance, recently, the EU is trying to ban Malaysia’s palm oil, ban Thai fishery products and considering whether to withdraw a trade preference scheme from Cambodia. Malaysia’s case relates to the banning of palm oil.

Thailand’s case relates to the issuance of Yellow Card for Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU). Cambodia’s case relates to the possible withdrawal of trade preferences under the Everything but Arms (EBA) trade tariff scheme.

While the first two cases involve the possible banning of specific products, Cambodia’s case, if the preferences are withdrawn, does not involve the banning of products or the closure of specific markets but rather the application of normal tariffs to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to which the EU is supposed to provide preferential treatment.

The EU has market power that can combine force and strength of the proposed sanctions and non-tariff measures (NTMs). The actions taken by the EU against AMS provoked the issues of asymmetrical relations between a united organisation, the EU, against specific members of another organization, Asean, that is not a union.

Asymmetrical issues also drew the questions whether the EU, as an organisation, has better compliance than Asean in terms of human rights, democracy and environmental values. Although the EU’s actions affect particular AMS’ trade in generic term, they can also hamper Asean’s institutional image as a region that gives less consideration to human rights, democracy and the environment. Whether Asean, as an organisation can accept such labelling or not is another issue for discussion between these two organisations.

Challenges, complexities

At the bilateral level, the unpleasant interactions between the EU and AMS that the AMS cannot fully foresee are the scope and scale of the impact of the EU’s legislations and complicated procedures while the EU’s decision is largely dependent on bureaucrats and politicians in Brussels who may not clearly understand AMS’s challenges, complexities and values as well as the sustainability impact of each decision. One Thai analyst said, “Thailand sacrificed blood, sweat and tears to overcome the stringent criteria outlined by the EU.”

Apart from the pure application of their technical procedures, the EU’s decisions can also be swayed by internal political situations, such as European parliamentary elections, as well as the EU’s own geopolitical calculations, for instance the China factor in regard to Cambodia’s EBA.

Once the procedure is launched, it is hard to stop or reverse. Malaysia had tried to lobby some EU member states with the belief that some of them may block the EU’s legislations.

The case of Thailand offered a successful example by way of conforming to the EU’s demands. Thailand could make it because the EU’s demands are involved largely with law enforcement and amelioration of technical management of the issues. Therefore, responses from Thailand can be visible, measurable and, most importantly, “do-able”.

Malaysia’s case is relatively harder than Thailand’s to comply with because the nature of the product itself is considered by the EU as not environmentally friendly. It involves much larger schemes than simply elevating the quality of products or enhancing consideration over the environment. The environmental standard imposed by the EU is very vague and, as the case has proved, the EU did not accept the certification standard set by Malaysia in terms of environmental acknowledgement criteria over the products.

The EU’s demands with regard to Cambodia’s case are seen as the most difficult to comply with because the latter considered some of the EU’s requests as going beyond the red line of respect for sovereign independence and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of state. It is not about the issue of law enforcement, product quality, labour standards or environment considerations but about the perception regarding space for civil and political rights, which is hard to measure because the standard of compliance can vary even within the members of the EU.

Human rights

Despite the fact the EU is proving it is adhering to moral standards of human rights in providing trade preferential treatment, for Cambodia or other LDCs, the application of standards can equate to the denial of market access itself regarding the development phase of LDCs. For the post-conflict nations, it is an unrealistic expectation to demand they fully comply with all human rights conventions and treaties that they have ratified.

At the regional level, while the EU has mechanisms to resolve NTMs applied to EU member states or to utilise NTMs against third countries, Asean as an organisation does not have such tools and it does not appear that it is heading in that direction.

The EU side has many organisational tools in its approaches towards external partners, ranging from technical NTMs to non-technical NTMs, such as the cases of Malaysia using environmental justification, or the case of Thailand applying compliance issues of IUU or the case of Cambodia over the issues of democracy and human rights or geopolitical balance against China in the EU’s foreign policy.

As Asean is applying consensus in the decision-making process, AMS can block any progress or decision regarding cooperation with a specific dialogue partner. A case in point: In January 2019 Malaysia and Indonesia had deferred Asean’s decision in elevating its relations with the EU towards strategic partnership because of the EU’s discrimination against palm oil.

There are several lessons learned and applicable tools for member states to interact with one another when the NTMs are applied. The ideal is that states should not apply NTMs but, if they face NTMs, they may choose to conform or retaliate or use both approaches.

NTMs have caused mistrust and are considered as hindrances to the enhancement of cooperation, mutual respect and understanding. In a growing inter-dependent world, NTMs and sanctions rarely yield satisfactory results unless the affected states are totally isolated, which can never be the case. Moreover, as the above cases have shown, it may also provoke political, economic and geopolitical backlashes against states that choose to utilise NTMs.

If states intend to pursue equal partnerships, they should seek to balance mutual interests, to understand the specific context of their partners and to seek agreeable win-win solutions over differences instead of one-sidedly imposing their own agendas or interests because such actions are proven to be counterproductive.

តើ​អ្វី​ទៅ ជា​រង្វាស់​ទិន្នផល​ការងារ​ការបរទេស?

តើ​អ្វី​ទៅ ជា​រង្វាស់​ទិន្នផល​ការងារ​ការបរទេស?

Phnom Penh Post | Publication date 16 December 2019

ក្នុងនាម​ជា​ក្រសួង​នយោបាយ ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស និង​សហប្រតិបត្តិការ​អន្តរជាតិ ប្រហែល​ជា​ក្រសួង​ដែល​ពិបាក​វាស់​ស្ទង់​ទិន្នផល​ការងារ​ជាងគេ​។ បើ​ប្រៀបធៀប​ក្រសួង​សាធារណការ​ដែល​ធ្វើ​ផ្លូវ​ឃើញ​ផ្លូវ​ធ្វើ​ស្ពាន​ឃើញ​ស្ពាន​តើ​យើង​វាស់​ទិន្នផល​ការងារ​ការបរទេស​ដោយ​របៀបណា​? តើ​ការងារ​ការបរទេស​គឺ​ជា​ការងារ​ប្រជុំ​ពាក់​ក្រវាត់ក ជល់​កែវស្រា​ក្រហម ហើយ​ថតរូប​ ឬ​យ៉ាងណា​? ​តើ​ទៅ​ប្រជុំ​បាន​លទ្ធផល​អ្វី​ក្រៅពី​សេចក្តី​ថ្លែងការណ៍ ៤-១០ ​ទំព័រ​នោះ​?

ទិន្នផល​ការងារ​ការបរទេស​ពឹង​អាស្រ័យ​ភាគច្រើន​លើ​ទស្សនៈ​យល់ឃើញ​របស់​សាធារណៈ (public perception) ហើយ​ក្នុង​អត្ថបទ​នេះ ខ្ញុំ​សូម​លើក​យក​នូវ​ទិដ្ឋភាព​ ៣ យ៉ាង​ដែលជា​កត្តា​វាស់​ស្ទង់​ទិន្នផល​ការងារ​ការបរទេស​។

ទី១ ​ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​គឺជា “​អ្នក​បើកទ្វារ​កាលានុវត្តភាព​”​។ ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស គឺជា​អ្នកស្វែងរក​ជា​អ្នក​គោះទ្វារ និង​អ្នក​បើកទ្វារ​កាលានុវត្តភាព លើ​វិស័យ​វិនិយោគ​ពាណិជ្ជកម្ម ជំនួយ​អភិវឌ្ឍន៍​អាហារូបករណ៍​វគ្គ​បណ្តុះបណ្តាល ការងារ​កម្មសិក្សា កម្មវិធី​ផ្លាស់ប្តូរ​វប្បធម៌ និង​យុវជន​។​ល​។

បើ​ការបរទេស​មិនអាច​ចរចា​ដាក់​បញ្ចូល​ក្នុង​របៀបវារៈ​នូវ​គម្រោង​ផែនការ​សកម្មភាព ដែល​មាន​ប្រយោជន៍​ដល់​ខ្មែរ​ ឬ​ដាក់បញ្ចូល​អាទិភាព​អភិវឌ្ឍ​ជាតិ​ក្នុង​របៀបវារៈ​អន្តរជាតិ​នោះ ក៏​ពុំមាន​ការចាប់​កកើត​នូវ​សកម្មភាព​ការវិយោគ​សាធារណៈ​ និង​ឯកជន​លើ​ហេដ្ឋារចនាសម្ព័ន្ធ​ទន់​ និង​រឹង​របស់​កម្ពុជា​ដែរ​។ ពិតណាស់ថា ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​មិនមែន​ជា​តួអង្គ​ឯក​តួអង្គ​ទោល​នោះ​ទេ តែ​យើង​អាច​និយាយ​បាន​ថា ជា​តួអង្គ​ដែល​បើកទ្វារ​ដំបូង​គេ​។

ថ្វីដ្បិត​តែ​ក្រសួង​ជំនាញ​ជា​អ្នកទទួល​ធនធាន​ និង​ទទួល​ខុសត្រូវ អនុវត្ត​ផ្ទាល់​ក៏ដោយ ក៏​ការស្នើ​គម្រោង​អភិវឌ្ឍន៍​មួយចំនួន​ត្រូវ​ធ្វើ​ឡើង​តាម​ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស ហើយ​ជាមួយ​ប្រទេស​ខ្លះ​គឺ​ត្រូវមាន​ការចុះហត្ថលេខា​លើ​លិខិត​ប្តូរ​សារ​រវាង​រដ្ឋមន្ត្រី​ការបរទេស​កម្ពុជា​ជាមួយ​នឹង​ទូត ឬ​តំណាង​ការបរទេស​នៃ​ប្រទេស​ដៃគូ​ជាមុន​សិន​មុន​នឹង​ក្រសួង​ជំនាញ​ឈាន​ដល់​ដំណាក់កាល​អនុវត្ត​គម្រោង​។ វេទិកា​នៃ​សំណើ​រាល់​គម្រោង​សំខាន់ៗ​នានា​គឺ​ធ្វើ​ឡើង​នៅក្នុង​ជំនួប​អន្តររដ្ឋាភិបាល​ដែល​មាន​ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​ជា​សេនាធិការ​សម្របសម្រួល​។

ជា​ឧទាហរណ៍​ជាក់ស្តែង សេចក្តី​ថ្លែងការណ៍​ក្រុង​ភ្នំពេញ និង​ផែនការ​សកម្មភាព​ប្រាំ​ឆ្នាំ​នៃ​កិច្ចសហប្រតិបត្តិការ​មេគង្គ-ឡានឆាង គឺជា​ឯកសារយោង​ដ៏សំខាន់​សម្រាប់​ក្រសួង​ជំនាញ​លើក​ជា​សំណើ​គម្រោង​ដែល​ពាក់ព័ន្ធ​នឹង​វិស័យ​អាទិភាព ដើម្បី​សុំ​ថវិកា​ទ្រទ្រង់​ពី​មូលនិធិ​ពិសេស​នៃ​ក្របខ័ណ្ឌ​កិច្ចសហប្រតិបត្តិការ​មេគង្គ-ឡានឆាង​ហើយ​តួអង្គ​ចម្បង​ក្នុង​ការចរចា​ខ្លឹមសារ​នៃ​សេចក្តី​ថ្លែងការណ៍​ និង​ផែនការ​សកម្មភាព​នេះ​គឺ​ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​គឺជា​អ្នកចរចា​បញ្ចូល​ទិសដៅ​អាទិភាព​នៃ​ការអភិវឌ្ឍ​របស់​កម្ពុជា​ និង​ប្រមែប្រមូល​ធាតុ​ចូល​នានា​ពី​ក្រសួង​ជំនាញ​។

គម្រោង​អភិវឌ្ឍន៍​ទាំងអស់​សុទ្ធតែ​លើកឡើង​ដោយ​យោង​ទៅ​លើ​ខ្លឹមសារ​នៃ​សេចក្តី​ថ្លែងការណ៍​រួម​ ឬ​ផែនការ​សកម្មភាព​នៃ​ក្របខ័ណ្ឌ​កិច្ចសហប្រតិបត្តិការ​ណាមួយ​។

ការសាងសង់​ស្ពាន​អ្នកលឿង​ត្រូវ​ឆ្លងកាត់​ការចរចា​ជិត​ ១០ ​ឆ្នាំ​ហើយ​អ្នកការទូត​កម្ពុជា​ត្រូវ​ទៅ​ជួប​ពន្យល់​សមាជិក​សភា​ជប៉ុន​ដែល​ប្រឆាំង​នឹង​គម្រោង​នេះ ហើយ​ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​តែងតែ​បញ្ចូល​ក្នុង​ចំណុច​ពិភាក្សា​របស់​ថ្នាក់ដឹកនាំ​កម្ពុជា​អំពី​សារៈសំខាន់​នៃ​ស្ពាន​អ្នកលឿង​ស្ទើរតែ​គ្រប់​វេទិកា​ទាំង​កម្រិត​ទ្វេភាគី អនុតំបន់​មេគង្គ និង​ក្របខ័ណ្ឌ​អាស៊ាន ទម្រាំ​យើង​ទទួល​បាន​គម្រោង​អភិវឌ្ឍន៍​ដ៏ធំ​សម្បើម​មួយ​នេះ​។

បើ​និយាយ​ឲ្យ​ងាយ​យល់​ជាង​នេះ​ឧបមា​ថា បើ​យើង​គ្មាន​ទូត តើ​នរណា​ជា​បង្អួច​ចរចា​ស្នើសុំ​ការបង្កើត​ឱកាស​ការងារ​ដល់​ពលករ​ខ្មែរ​? តើ​នរណា​ដែល​បរទេស​ត្រូវ​ទាក់ទង​ដំបូង ដើម្បី​សាកសួរ​ពី​កាលានុវត្តភាព​ពាណិជ្ជកម្ម និង​វិនិយោគ​?

ថ្វីដ្បិតតែ​ការរីកចម្រើន​នៃ​បច្ចេកវិទ្យា​អាច​ឲ្យ​គេ​ស្វែងរក​ព័ត៌មាន​បាន​ច្រើន​ពី​កម្ពុជា​ក៏ដោយ ក៏​អន្តរជាតិ​នៅតែ​ត្រូវការ​ស្តាប់​សំឡេង​ផ្ទាល់​របស់​តំណាង​កម្ពុជា ដើម្បី​ថ្លឹងថ្លែង​វិនិច្ឆ័យ​ពី​សភាពការណ៍​ពិត​នៅក្នុង​ប្រទេស​។ ម្យ៉ាង​ក៏​ព្រោះថា ព័ត៌មាន​ដ៏ច្រើន​លើសលប់​ក៏​មិនប្រាកដ​ថា សុទ្ធតែ​ជា​ព័ត៌មាន​ពិត​ទាំងស្រុង​មាន​ប្រយោជន៍​ចំពោះ​កម្ពុជា ឬ​គ្មាន​របៀបវារៈ​នយោបាយ​បរទេស​ដែរ​។

ត្រង់នេះ​គឺ​យើង​ចូលដល់​ចំណុច​ ទី២ ដែល​ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​មាន​តួនាទី​ជា​ “​អ្នក​បង្ការ​ទប់ស្កាត់​វិបត្តិ​”​។ ការការពារ​វិបត្តិ​គឺ​ពិបាក​នឹង​មើលឃើញ ព្រោះ​ពេលខ្លះ ការ​ឡបប៊ី​ត្រូវ​ធ្វើ​ឡើង​ក្រោយ​ឆាក​ចៀសវាង​ទទួលរង​ការរិះគន់​ពី​តួអង្គ​ដែល​ប្រឆាំង​នឹង​ភាពល្អូកល្អិន​នៃ​ទំនាក់ទំនង​រវាង​រាជរដ្ឋាភិបាល​កម្ពុជា ជាមួយ​នឹង​ប្រទេស​ដៃគូ​។

នៅពេល​ដែល​មាន​វិបត្តិ​កើតឡើង​មាន​ការវាយប្រហារ​លើ​ភាពស្របច្បាប់​របស់​រាជរដ្ឋាភិបាល​កិត្យានុភាព​ជាតិ និង​សមិទ្ធផល​ជាក់ស្តែង​របស់​រដ្ឋាភិបាល​ និង​ប្រជាជន​ ឬ​មានការ​រំលោភបំពាន​លើ​អធិបតេយ្យភាព​ និង​បូរណភាព​ទឹកដី​របស់​កម្ពុជា ក្រសួង​ការបរទេស​គឺជា​ទាហាន​ឈានមុខ​ដែល​មិនមែន​ជា​កង​ប្រដាប់អាវុធ​ដែល​ធ្វើ​ជា​ខែល​ការពារ​ដំបូង​គេ​។

វិបត្តិ​នយោបាយ​របស់​កម្ពុជា​មិនមែន​កើតឡើង​ដោយសារ​តែ​តួអង្គ​ក្នុង​ប្រទេស​នោះទេ គឺ​មាន​ការ​លូកដៃ​ចូល​យ៉ាង​ជ្រាលជ្រៅ​ពី​តួអង្គ​នៅក្រៅ​ប្រទេស​ទាំង​ជនជាតិខ្មែរ​ និង​បរទេស​។

ប្រឈម​នឹង​ការវាយប្រហារ​បែបនេះ តួនាទី​ការងារ​ការបរទេស​មាន​សារៈសំខាន់​ខ្លាំង​ក្នុង​ការការពារ​ស្ថិរភាព​ម៉ាក្រូ​ទាំង​សេដ្ឋកិច្ច និង​នយោបាយ និង​សេចក្តី​ថ្លៃថ្នូរ​ និង​កិត្តិនាម​របស់​ប្រជាជន​ និង​ប្រជាជាតិ​ខ្មែរ​។

បើ​គ្មាន​តំណាង​ឯ​ក្រៅ​ប្រទេស​ទេ បរទេស​ភាគច្រើន​ដែល​គ្មាន​ព័ត៌មាន​អ្វី​ក្រៅពី​អ៊ីនធឺណិត​ប្រាកដ​ជា​គិតថា​ខ្មែរ​វេទនា​ដូច​ឋាននរក​ស្រមៃ​ឃើញ​តែ​របប​ប្រល័យ​ពូជសាសន៍ គ្រាប់មីន អសន្តិសុខ គ្មាន​ស្ថិរភាព​។​ល​។ ហើយ​ងាយ​នឹង​យល់ច្រឡំ​ថា កម្ពុជា​មិនមែន​ជា​ទីស្ថាន​នៃ​ការវិនិយោគ ឬ​ជា​ដៃគូ​ពាណិជ្ជកម្ម​ដែល​មាន​ប្រយោជន៍​។

នៅពេល​មាន​ការឈ្លានពាន​ពី​ប្រទេស​ដទៃ តើ​មាន​នរណា​ដែលជា​អ្នកចរចា​ព្រំដែន ដើរ​ពន្យល់​ប្រទេស​ដទៃ​ថា កម្ពុជា​ជា​ជនរងគ្រោះ នៅពេល​ដែល​ភាគី​ម្ខាង​ទៀត​នៃ​ជម្លោះ​អាច​មាន​ស្ថានទូត​លើសពី​ ១០០ មាន​មន្ត្រី​ទូត​ដែលមាន​សមត្ថភាព​អាច​ពន្យល់​គ្រប់​ទិដ្ឋភាព​ច្បាប់ និង​នយោបាយ​ហើយ​ថែម​ទាំង​មាន​ទំនាក់ទំនង​ពាណិជ្ជកម្ម​​រឹងមាំ​ជាង​កម្ពុជា​ទៀត​នោះ​?

ទិដ្ឋភាព​ចុងក្រោយ​គឺ​អ្នក​ការទូត​ប្រៀប​បាន​ដូចជា ​“​ទែរម៉ូម៉ែត្រ​មនុស្ស​” (human thermometer)​។ អ្នកការទូត​គឺជា​អ្នក​ស្ទង់​ដឹង​មុនគេ​នូវ​ស្ថានភាព​ក្តៅ​ត្រជាក់​នៃ​ទំនាក់ទំនង​ជាមួយ​ប្រទេស​ដៃគូ ឬ​ស្ថានភាព​តំបន់ និង​សកល​ដែល​អាច​ប៉ះពាល់​ដល់​ផលប្រយោជន៍​ជាតិ​កម្ពុជា​។

អ្នកការទូត​ គឺជា​អ្នក​ស្ទង់​ដឹង​មុនគេ​នៅពេល​ណា​ដែល​ប្រទេស​ណាមួយ​មាន​បំណង​អមិត្ត​ចំពោះ​កម្ពុជា​ចង់​ដាក់ទណ្ឌកម្ម ឬ​សម្ពាធ​នយោបាយ​ការទូត​ និង​សេដ្ឋកិច្ច​មកលើ​កម្ពុជា ហើយ​ក៏​ជា​អ្នកដឹង​ជាងគេ​ថា តើ​តួអង្គ​ណា​ខ្លះ​ដែល​មាន​បំណងល្អ ឬ​អាក្រក់​ចំពោះ​កម្ពុជា ហើយ​យើង​ត្រឡប់​ទៅ​ចំណុច​ទី ២ វិញ ពោល​គឺ​តាមរយៈ​ព័ត៌មាន​ទាំងនេះ​អ្នកការទូត​ត្រូវ​ដើរតួ​ឈានមុខ​ក្នុង​ការការពារ​វិបត្តិ​ការទូត កុំ​ឲ្យ​កើត​មានឡើង ឬ​បើ​កើតមាន​ហើយ​ក្តី ត្រូវ​ដើរតួ​ជា​អ្នក​ដោះស្រាយ បង្រួម​ជម្លោះ បង្កើន​ការយោគយល់​គ្នា និង​កសាង​ការជឿទុកចិត្ត​ឡើងវិញ​។

ជារួម​យើង​អាច​មាន​ការបកស្រាយ​ច្រើន​អំពី​ទិដ្ឋភាព​ការងារ​ការបរទេស ប៉ុន្តែ ខាងលើ​នេះ​គឺជា​ទិដ្ឋភាព​ ៣ ​ត្រួសៗ​ដែល​​សុទ្ធសឹង​ជា​ការងារ​អរូបី គ្មាន​រង្វាស់​ខ្នាត និង​សូចនាករ ប៉ុន្តែ​ទន្ទឹម​នឹង​នេះ​គឺ​សុទ្ធតែ​ជា​ការងារ​ស្នូល​ដែល​មិនអាច​ខ្វះខាត​បាន​ទាក់ទង​នឹង​ផលប្រយោជន៍​ជាតិ​កម្ពុជា​៕

 
ដោយ ស៊ឹម វីរៈ ទីប្រឹក្សា​យុទ្ធសាស្ត្រ​នៃ​វិទ្យាស្ថាន​ចក្ខុវិស័យ​អាស៊ី (AVI)